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Overconfidence commonly refers to a cognitive bias in which people express more subjective 
confidence in their abilities than can be objectively justified. Similarly, the “Unskilled and 
Unaware” literature demonstrates that individuals who are lowest in experience or knowledge are 
often the most overconfident. Further, recent research on decision aids and training programs 
suggests that improving task-specific skills can causally reduce task-specific overconfidence 
biases. However, these training benefits do not appear to transfer or otherwise reduce 
overconfidence on untrained judgment tasks more generally. One important example of general 
training is Morewedge et al. (2015), where training specific decision biases (e.g., confirmation 
bias) led to reduced overconfidence for better-than-average overconfidence effects. While these 
findings are promising, research has not yet investigated the potential benefits of programs 
designed to train general decision making skills, such as risk literacy skills (i.e., the ability to 
evaluate and understand risk; See Cokely et al., 2018). Accordingly, I report results from the first 
experimental study to test the benefits of an online risk literacy tutor (tutor.lolevo.com) designed 
to improve graph literacy skills (e.g., interpreting bar, pie, line, icon arrays, and decision tree 
graphs). Statistical and structural modeling results revealed that the graph literacy tutor causally 
improved graph literacy skills, which in turn causally reduced biases on several untrained, 
conceptually distinct decision tasks (framing effects, ratio bias, and sunk costs). Moreover, 
improvements in graph literacy also transferred benefits to untrained overconfidence measures, 
causally improving self-evaluations on the untrained decision tasks.  Consistent with Skilled 
Decision Theory, results indicated that risk literacy skills are trainable and are related to general 
decision making skills. Further, results suggested that training risk literacy skills could have 
implications for an abundance of risky situations (e.g., Covid-19 risk knowledge, heart attack 
symptom recognition) because training risk literacy can reduce many kinds of decision biases, 
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including multiple types of potentially trainable overconfidence biases (e.g., overestimation, 
overprecision, overplacement). In addition to other theoretical implications, it is noteworthy that 
the current study appears to be the first to discover a direct causal link between risk literacy skills 
and valuable metacognitive skills. Risk literacy skills causally promote skilled self-evaluation 














Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Some individuals are overconfident, thinking they have more skills than reality justifies 
(Lichenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1977; Moore & Healy, 2008). One major factor in why 
people make biased decisions may be their overconfidence bias (Kahneman, 2011). For years, 
efforts to reduce overconfidence have often resulted in mixed outcomes (Moore et al., 2018). 
Some researchers also believe that overconfidence is not likely to improve through training 
(Kahneman, 2011). However, the research found in the “Unskilled and Unaware” literature 
showed that individuals could improve in overconfidence with gained experience for specific 
domains (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Ehrlinger et al., 2008).  Further, Morewedge et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that an individual could lower overconfidence for social comparisons (better-than-
average effects) by training specific decision biases and providing feedback on confidence 
judgments. While Morewedge et al. (2015) are among the first to demonstrate the reduction of 
overconfidence by training specific decision making tasks, there is currently no evidence that 
overconfidence can be reduced via training general decision making skills like risk literacy skills 
(i.e., the ability to evaluate and understand risk). Growing evidence demonstrates that risk 
literacy skills, like statistical numeracy and graph literacy, are related to more calibrated self-
evaluations and less overconfidence bias (Ghazal et al., 2014; Ybarra et al., in-prep). Evidence 
from risk literacy and previous overconfidence research leads to the idea that overconfidence 
could potentially be trained generally (Cokely et al., 2018; Ybarra et al., 2017). So, does training 
risk literacy skills help individuals avoid the overconfidence bias?  
 The following study took a previously validated risk literacy tutor and experimentally 
measured group differences in graph literacy, three decision making tasks (framing, ratio bias, 
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and sunk cost), and three distinct types of overconfidence (overestimation, overprecision, and 
overplacement). The results indicated that the risk literacy tutor tended to improve graph literacy 
and decision making task performance when controlling for statistical numeracy. 
Overconfidence in the decision making tasks tended to be more calibrated for those who 
completed the risk literacy tutor. The reduction in overconfidence tended to be for individuals at 
all levels of task performance, suggesting improved performance sensitivity for those who 
completed the risk literacy tutor. Implications suggest that risk literacy skills play one vital role 














Chapter 2: Confidence and Risk Literacy 
2.1 History of Self-Evaluations 
 
How do we know what we know? The study of self-evaluations (comparisons of self-monitored 
information to a standard or a goal; Bandura, 1986) has a long history that dates to Socrates and 
has persisted through time. Many notable scientists and philosophers have touched on self-
evaluations and the importance of knowing what we know and who we are (e.g., self-knowledge) 
– often focusing on knowing oneself and the consequences of not (Wilson, 2009). For example, 
some philosophers believe that accurate self-knowledge is crucial as it is 1) required for wisdom 
and 2) essential for knowledge (Renz, 2017). Additionally, some psychologists believe that 
accurate self-evaluations are essential for making good decisions related to health, education, 
social issues, and workplace matters (Dunning et al., 2004; Moore, 2020; Grant, 2021). 
This discussion of self-evaluations finds its roots, like many others, in ancient Greece. In 
the town of Delphi, one can find the ruins of a temple built in dedication to the god Apollo and 
once inscribed with 147 sayings called the Delphic Maxims attributed to Apollo himself 
(Markopoulos & Vanharanta, 2017). This temple became a mainstay of some of the great 
philosophers of the time (470-399 BCE), including Socrates. The maxims’ influence on 
Socrates’ work is evident in one discussion found in Plato's Apology (399 BCE; Kamtekar, 2016; 
2017), where Socrates recalled the maxim "Know thyself." In this recollection, Socrates spoke of 
the craftsmen who know only their crafts but falsely believed that they knew virtue. A modern 
cognitive psychology interpretation of this recollection could be that the craftsmen knew 
themselves in their self-evaluations related to their skill, but less so in other concepts, like virtue. 
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“Know thyself” appears in more of Socrates’ teachings. For example, one of Socrates' 
students, Xenophon, wrote in Memorabilia (371 BCE; Bonnette, 1994) about the importance of 
the maxim "Know thyself." Xenophon quoted Socrates: 
[T}hose who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and 
discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get 
what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand, 
they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently, through their power of 
testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what is good 
and shun what is bad.  
Thus, as quoted, Socrates described the benefits of knowing oneself and knowing others (for 
further information, see Socrates and Self-Knowledge by Moore, 2015). 
Around the turn of the millennium, the idea of self-evaluations shifted to focus more on 
the human connection with and distinction from God (Renz, 2017). Saint Augustin (354-430 CE) 
wrote about the ethical implications for knowing oneself and how it relates to the individual's 
relationship with God (Brachtendorf, 2017). Augustin's interpretation implies that a sinner is 
aware of their actions but lacks accurate self-evaluations and loves themself too much. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225 – 1274 CE) carried on the religious line of thinking about self-knowledge. 
Aquinas wrote that God is omniscient. We as humans reflect God but do not possess complete 
knowledge of ourselves and must think about thinking when observing external objects or 
situations (Perler, 2017). For instance, Aquinas wrote that we as people use experiences to 
construct labels that define ourselves (e.g., "I am a parent" or "I am a good person"; Cory, 2014).  
The idea of self-evaluations can be found in the writings of modern philosophers as well. 
One interpretation of the writings of Descartes (1596-1650 CE) is that knowing yourself may 
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contribute to one's happiness (Renz, 2017). Further, knowing our limitations is important for 
knowing ourselves, and understanding our limitations is derived from our 
failures and understanding of others' failures. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1657 CE) wrote about the 
idea that our self-evaluations are built from our understanding of our actions and others' actions. 
Renz (2018) put forth the idea, based on Hobbes' work The Leviathan, that access to one's own 
experience is a prerequisite for self-knowledge. Garret (2017) believed that Hobbes wrote that 
comparisons of commonalities with others are essential for knowing thyself. Finally, Immanuel 
Kant's (1724-1804 CE) writings touched on the concept of self-knowledge. Emundts (2017) 
spoke about Kant's idea that we can deceive our self-knowledge into justifying our immoral 
actions. These ideas of modern philosophers set the underpinnings of theories of self-evaluations 
in psychology. 
By the end of the 19th century, psychology was in its infancy, yet the idea of self-
evaluations was present. For example, in William James' 1880 Principles of Psychology, he 
proposed an equation for self-esteem (a concept thought to be related to self-evaluations and 
overconfidence) where self-esteem is the ratio of one's success to their aspirations. James has an 
entire chapter dedicated to the conception of the self and how people self-identify. Sigmund 
Freud, around this time, explored self-evaluations with his psychoanalytic therapy, in which a 
patient could express their true selves (Reginster, 2017). The first formal self-evaluation 
measures began around this time. The first confidence studies began in 1884 with Pierce and 
Jastrow, and the concept continued in 1892 in a study by Fullerton and Cattell (Bjorkman, Juslin, 
& Winman, 1993). Psychology matured as a field around this time, which led to many research 
streams related to self-evaluations. Of these many branches, I am particularly interested in the 
inaccuracy of self-evaluations (e.g., overconfidence) and how it is related to decision making. 
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2.2 Overconfidence in Decision Making 
 
For centuries, accurate self-evaluations have been considered significant for a variety of reasons. 
For instance, accurate self-evaluations tend to be one of the predictors of academic achievement, 
accounting for 46.3% of the total variance (Stankov et al., 2012). However, some individuals 
falsely believed they were better, exhibited more skill, or had more ability than they do (Kruger 
& Dunning, 1999; Griffin & Brenner, 2004). This phenomenon wherein individuals believe 
themselves to be better than they are or unjustly think they are better than others is called 
the overconfidence bias. One definition of the overconfidence bias from Moore and Schatz 
(2017) is "greater confidence than reality justifies." Moore and Schatz say that people display 
overconfidence bias when they compare incorrect self-beliefs with reality. For example, a 
student who believes they did well on a test but actually failed may be considered overconfident. 
In his 2011 book Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman called the overconfidence bias "the 
most significant of the cognitive biases,", especially for decision making. Kahneman gave 
several examples of how people are overconfident in their decisions. In one example, stock 
traders overconfidently picked stocks only to end up losing money. In another instance, 
Kahneman described how the most confident clinicians were wrong about patient 
diagnoses 40% of the time. Kahneman stated that overconfidence "contributes to an explanation 
of why people litigate, why they start wars, and why they open small businesses."   
Kahneman's view on overconfidence is only one perspective of many from various fields 
that study overconfidence. Stankov and Kleitman (2008) gave an overview of different streams 
of confidence research, the first being related to self-confidence and personality. In this stream of 
research, confidence tends to be a personality trait like "assertiveness." The next stream focuses 
on education and psychological assessment, for which the example given is the use of 
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overconfidence in cognitive tests and focuses on self-regulation (a metacognitive process thought 
to be necessary for learning). In this research, self-evaluations are thought to be an integral part 
of self-regulatory behaviors (Flavell, 1979; Zimmerman, 2000). The last stream of confidence 
research stems from psychologists studying decision making. This stream of overconfidence 
research is the primary focus of this dissertation. 
The stream of research focused on overconfidence in decision making is often believed to 
have gained popularity from a 1977 study by Lichenstein and Fischhoff. The study aimed to see 
if individuals who knew nothing on a subject (picking stocks) would know if they were poor 
performing on that subject. They gave participants trend data on various stocks and asked which 
ones would increase in value over five weeks. Lichenstein and Fischhoff then asked, "on a scale 
from 50% to 100% what is the probability that your choice is correct?" They found that most 
participants were overconfident. On average, participants were correct only about 47% of the 
time but rated their confidence an average 18% higher. In an additional experiment, they found 
that individuals who were more knowledgeable on a subject tended to be less overconfident than 
less knowledgeable individuals. 
The 1977 Fischhoff and Lichenstein study also formalized a way of measuring 
overconfidence using a calibration equation. The original equation is 
 
Calibration = (1/N) T t=1 nt (rt – ct) 
 
Where N is the total number of responses, nt is the number of times the response rt was used, ct 
is the proportion correct for all items assigned probability rt, and T is the total number of 
different response categories used. In sum, calibration is the difference between subjective 
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confidence judgments and the objective number of questions correct. A positive difference 
indicates overconfidence. This method of measurement of overconfidence persists in 
contemporary confidence studies. 
Fischhoff and Lichenstein had two more published studies in 1977 on the topic of 
overconfidence. One completed with Paul Slovic asked participants to rate their confidence in 
answering general knowledge questions in various formats (e.g., open-ended vs. two 
alternatives). Like the previous study, participants tended to be overconfident in their degree of 
correctness. More overconfident participants were also more willing to gamble money on their 
correctness. The other of their 1977 overconfidence studies was an overview of previous studies 
on overconfidence. Findings included that participants believed themselves to be better than they 
actually were on a multitude of different tasks, that there is little research dedicated to training 
and overcoming overconfidence, and individuals like weather forecasters tend to be less 
overconfident when weather forecasting, but the reasons why are unclear. 
Fischhoff and Lichenstein’s series of studies in 1977 provided evidence for a systematic 
overconfidence bias in various tasks. However, Fischhoff and Lichenstein did not fully theorize 
why and how individuals were overconfident. Koriat et al. (1980) conducted the first study 
dedicated to exploring how individuals are biased in their confidence. The study again 
had individuals answer general knowledge questions and then subjectively estimate their 
proportion correct. However, this time participants had to provide explanations to support their 
decision. When participants gave less evidence to support contradicting alternatives, they were 
more likely to be overconfident. The thought being that overconfidence derives from neglecting 
evidence. Moreover, more salient evidence is associated with reductions in overconfidence. 
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The idea of making evidence more salient can be found in one of the first papers to 
theorize how confidence judgments are processed. The Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM) 
theory by Gigerenzer et al. (1991) is based on probabilistic functionalism by Egon Brunswik 
(1952; Hammond & Stewart, 2001). Probabilistic functionalism is the idea that an organism 
deals with uncertainty in the environment by evaluating its cues. Thus, probabilistic 
functionalism would suggest that overconfidence results when non-salient cues fail to 
be understood. Individuals then inaccurately assess their performance, such as the overconfident 
participants in Koriat et al. (1980). 
To construct a probabilistic mental model, an individual creates a reference class, a target 
variable, probability cues, and cue validities. The example in the 1991 study detailed responses 
to a general knowledge question like "Which city in Oklahoma has more inhabitants? a) 
Oklahoma City or b) Tulsa." Suppose the participant answering the question does not know the 
answer. The participant would have to construct a PMM to solve the question. One of the first 
steps in constructing a PMM is selecting a reference class. The reference class in this example 
might be "all cities in Oklahoma." This reference class then determines which cues can function 
as probability cues for the target variable and their cue validities. For instance, a valid cue in the 
reference class might be NBA teams. Larger cities tend to have professional NBA teams, so 
which of the two cities has a professional NBA team? The cue is cognitively tested for 
correctness and compared to other cues. The cue validity then determines confidence judgments. 
For example, the NBA team cue may be strong, leading to the correct answer of Oklahoma City 




The PMM model is one prevailing theory in how and why individuals exhibit the 
overconfidence bias, but it still leaves many questions unanswered. For example, how do 
individuals become less overconfident? Juslin et al. (1997) explained that for an individual to 
have perfect calibration under the theory of PMM, the individual would have to 1) have accurate 
mental representations of the ecological probabilities (cognitive adjustment, something akin to 
representative knowledge based on a reference class), 2) without error convert the ecological 
probabilities into an overt confidence judgment (error-free translation), and 3) encounter tasks 
that are representatively designed corresponding to their ecological probabilities. The third point, 
in essence, states that the individual’s tasks should represent the knowledge that the individual 
would sample. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) gave the example of a typical general knowledge 
question that asked, "Which city is farther north? a) New York or b) Rome" as evidence to this 
point. The participant could generate a reference class of "general knowledge question," which 
may lead to an incorrect answer and overconfidence. The idea is that the generated reference 
class is incorrect due to the question being hard or misleading while selecting a more 
representative question like "Which city in Oklahoma has more inhabitants?" leads to the 
generation of the reference class "cities in Oklahoma." This reference class then may lead to a 
correct answer and less overconfidence.  How, then, do individuals generate reference classes?  
Koriat (2012) constructed a model called the Self-Consistency Model (SCM) that 
postulates that the primary cue that confidence judgments use is self-consistency. According to 
the SCM, individuals validate their knowledge or experiences by retrieving information from 
memories sampled from the outside world to form hypotheses of the population and determine 
the likelihood that the conclusion reached is correct. This model claims that confidence is 
approximately the assessment of 
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“reproducibility – the likelihood that the same choice will be made in a subsequent 
encounter with the item. Although confidence judgments are construed as pertaining to 
validity – the probability that the chosen answer is correct, they are actually based on 
cues about reliability.”  
The primary idea of this approach is that confidence is the feedback and sampling of 
information. Thus, a confidence judgment based on this model would draw from an individual's 
number of experiences, the "richness" of the experience, cognitive factors, bias, and the 
environment outlined by PMM (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). Notably, an individual would reduce 
overconfidence bias by increasing the sample size or the richness of the feedback from 
experiences (e.g., "I am less overconfident because I’ve done this before and gotten similar 
outcomes" or "I often do well on problems like this"). 
Koriat et al. (2020) demonstrated the SCM empirically by having participants answer 
true/false to personality statements (e.g., "I hate to change my plans at the last minute") and 
measuring deliberation time. After making a true/false judgment, participants then made a 
confidence judgment on a scale ranging from 0-100 (0% – Not confident at all; 100% – 
Completely confident). Results indicated that individuals responded faster and were less 
overconfident for repeated questions. Results also indicated that participants had higher and 
faster confidence judgments for items that other participants agreed on. Koriat believed that this 
reflected their personal experiences (perceptional decisions, social beliefs, social attitudes, 
personal preferences, and category membership decisions; see Koriat et al., 2016). For example, 
individuals gave faster and higher confidence judgments for questions more in line with their 
political thinking ("conservative" or "liberal"). These results indicated that confidence judgments 
were based not only on knowledge but also on personal experiences. 
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In sum, theories and models of overconfidence indicate that humans build knowledge-
based mental models recalled from cues to help make decisions, evident from the PMM theory 
presented by Gigerenzer et al. (1991) and the SCM constructed by Koriat (2012). Still, growing 
evidence seems to indicate that not all confidence judgments are the same. It may be that 
different mental models are being constructed and perceived based on the type of overconfidence 
bias. Moore and Healy's 2008 article "The Trouble with Overconfidence" taxonomizes 
overconfidence bias into three distinct types: overestimation, overprecision, and overplacement. 
2.3 The Three Types of Overconfidence 
 
Recent advances in confidence research have focused on the measurement and taxonomy of 
confidence. Moore and Healy's 2008 paper "The Trouble with Overconfidence" classifies 
overconfidence into three distinct types (see Olsson, 2014). These three types of overconfidence 
are theoretically different, with separate measurements for each—table 1 breaks down each of 
the three types. The first type is the overestimation of one's actual ability, performance, level of 
control, or chance of success. Overestimation made up approximately 60% of the 645 empirical 
studies on overconfidence (numbers from Moore & Schatz, 2017).  
 Studies about overestimation often have participants rate their general abilities, skills, or 
forecasting concerning their domain-specific occupation or talent. For example, Garcia-
Retamero et al. (2016) created a subjective graph literacy scale that asked individuals questions 
about their general skill at working with different types of graphs (e.g., "How good are you at 
working with bar charts?") and had participants rate their skill on a scale from 1 – Not good at all 
to 6 – Extremely good. These subjective ratings were then compared to their objective graph 
literacy. In short, overestimation asks a general confidence question on a skill.          
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 The second type of overconfidence is overplacement, otherwise known as the better-
than-average phenomenon in which people falsely believe themselves to be better than others. 
This type of confidence made up approximately 21% of empirical studies (this percentage goes 
up significantly when "better-than-average" is a search term along with "overconfidence"; Moore 
& Healy, 2008). Kruger and Dunning’s 1999 study examined this type of overconfidence by 
having participants compare their score on the Law School Admissions Test to the average 
student’s score on a scale from 0 ("I am at the very bottom of percentile rankings”) to 99 (“I am 
at the very top”), with 50 being “I am exactly average.” A more recent example of 
overplacement research is the study by Larrick et al. (2007), in which students had to judge their 
test performance in relation to given information on the mean, range, and distribution of 
performers. Each student then estimated how many students they were better than, on average, 
followed by an overestimation confidence judgment. Results indicated that a percentage of 
students did falsely believe themselves to be better than average. Furthermore, there was a 
positive within-subjects correlation between overplacement and overestimation.  Moore (2007; 
see also Moore & Small, 2008) found that, generally, some individuals may be better at knowing 
themselves, but not others. In this case, individuals will not display overestimation but will show 
underplacement (i.e., worse-than-average). Note that most overconfidence studies do not 
measure more than one type of overconfidence, and even fewer measure all three (Olsson, 2014).   
 One way of measuring overplacement in decision making is the Bias Blind Spot (Pronin 
et al., 2002; Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Scopelliti et al., 2015; Ybarra, 2018, in-prep). The bias blind 
spot is an overplacement judgment wherein individuals assess their susceptibility to various 
decision biases and then judge others' susceptibility to each of the biases. Then the individual’s 
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bias judgment is subtracted from the other’s bias judgment for each bias. The difference score for 
each bias is then aggregated to estimate how blind individuals are to their biases.  
 The third type of overconfidence is overprecision, or excessive certainty regarding the 
accuracy of one’s belief, which made up 19% of empirical studies. Overprecision often compares 
an individual’s estimated number of correct answers on a task to the actual number of correct 
answers. Adams and Adams (1961) created a specific way to measure overprecision. Participants 
were asked their confidence on a full scale from 0-100% in their ability to recall nonsense 
syllables. The confidence scale was defined to the participant as “the percent of questions 
believed to be correctly answered” (i.e., 90% means that the participant believed they were 
correct on 90% of the questions). A difference score was then calculated by subtracting the 
number of questions answered correctly from the percentage of questions the participant believed 
to be correct, with the remaining score being the participant’s overconfidence (e.g., if a 
participant thought they answered 75% of questions correctly but scored 50% correct, the 
participant is thought to be overconfident by a degree of 25%). Often when measuring this type 
of overconfidence, it is translated into exact integers for clarity (e.g., “how many out of the ten 
asked questions did you answer correctly?”).   
 To further learn about the three types of overconfidence, see Don Moore’s (2020) book 
Perfectly Confident. Moore maintains that there are three types of overconfidence. However, 
Olsson (2014) states, “It is currently unknown to what extent these three different forms of 
overconfidence represent the same psychological construct, as only a handful of studies have 
investigated two or more ways of measuring overconfidence.” Essentially, there may be three 
distinct types of overconfidence, but the evidence is sparse (Olsson lists only two studies that 
measured all three types of overconfidence). Further, what does this mean regarding training 
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overconfidence? Does this mean that to lower various types of overconfidence bias, there needs 
to be different trainings? Unfortunately, there are currently zero training studies (to my reading) 
that compare all three types of overconfidence.     
 
Table 1 
Three Types of Confidence 
Confidence Definition Typical 
Measurement 
Example Articles 
Overestimation Overrating your 
actual ability, skill, 
level of control, or 



















Koriat et al. 
(2020) 
Overplacement Believing that you 




























Overprecision Too sure you have 














“I am going to 
get 90 out of 
100 questions 
correct on this 
statistics test” 
Reality: Gets 
50 out of 100 
questions 











2.4 Training Overconfidence 
 
In his 2011 book Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman concluded the section on 
overconfidence by saying, “Can overconfident optimism be overcome by training? I am not 
optimistic.” Continued, Kahneman wrote, “There have been numerous attempts to train people… 
with only a few reports of modest success.” Though results overall have been mixed, there are a 
few successful examples of training overconfidence. For instance, Royal Dutch Shell (commonly 
known as just Shell in the U.S.) oil and gas noticed that their newly hired geologists were often 
wrong and overconfident in predicting which wells would produce oil (Russo & Schoemaker, 
1992). Shell then created a training program to correct overconfidence, ultimately saving time 
and money. The training involved studying past cases, making confidence judgments, and finally 
receiving feedback on their confidence judgments’ accuracy. The training tended to double the 
number of correct wells to be drilled (2/10 wells to 4/10 wells being correct on average).   
 Overconfidence is perhaps trainable in a highly specified domain, but can overconfidence 
be trained for general decisions? One important and novel example by Morewedge et al. (2015) 
was part of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity’s (IARPA) SIRIUS game 
project. The Morewedge et al. IARPA game had individuals solve the mystery of a missing 
individual by coming to terms with their own social biases. One of the most improved biases was 
overplacement measured via the bias blind spot, showing a reduction of approximately one 
standard deviation (F (1, 241) = 151.66, p < .001, dpre-post = .98). While the results look 
promising, there is no evidence that the training would reduce the other two types of 
overconfidence.  
Further, in a related study by Scopelliti et al. (2015) that developed the bias blind spot 
measure, they found that the bias blind spot is unrelated to general decision making skills. These 
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results replicate conclusions by Dunning et al. (2004) that people’s self-views tend to be weakly 
related to actual behavior and performance. Why is it that individuals skilled and knowledgeable 
in decision making are more/still overconfident? Unfortunately, there have been no studies that 
train all three types of overconfidence and measure generalization to wide-ranging decision 
making skills (e.g., risk literacy) that could help answer these questions.  
2.5 Statistical Numeracy, Risk Literacy, and Skilled Decision Theory 
 
One definition of statistical numeracy is the practical understanding of probabilistic and 
statistical problem solving (Cokely et al., 2012). Statistical numeracy tends to be one of the best 
predictors of superior judgment and general decision making (Cokely et al., 2018; Cokely & 
Kelley, 2009; Lipkus & Peters. 2009; Peters, 2020; Reyna et al., 2009; 2020). Numeracy tends to 
independently predict when other independent predictors of performance such as fluid 
intelligence, cognitive reflection, and attentional control are assessed (Allan, 2018). Research on 
numerical and non-numerical tasks indicated that statistical numeracy’s predictive power goes 
beyond “just knowing the math.”  Numeracy tends to predict a cascade of metacognitive 
processes in which an individual evaluates and understands risk (Risk Literacy; see 
riskliteracy.org; Allan et al., 2017; Cokely et al., 2018; Petrova et al., 2017).   
Risk literacy seems to be an essential component of skilled and informed decision 
making. In a study by Cokely et al. (forthcoming; Ghazal, 2014), structural models showed that 
risk literacy tended to mediate the relationship between statistical numeracy and general decision 
making performance. The demonstrated relationship between risk and decision making explains 
in part why statistical numeracy and risk literacy are both strong predictors of general decision 
making skills: decision making is fundamentally about reckoning risk and uncertainty (Cokely et 
al., 2018).  If an individual understands probability theory and their personal limitations, skills, 
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knowledge, and values, they should theoretically be able to make a good decision. Skilled 
Decision Theory outlines the reasons for this.     
Skilled Decision Theory overviews the causal mechanisms for expert and skilled decision 
making in general (Cokely et al., 2018). The two primary mechanisms are 1) heuristic 
deliberation (e.g., metacognitive processing, Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Cokely et al., 2012) and 2) 
representative understanding (e.g., precise risk comprehension, Cokely et al., 2018). The first 
mechanism predicts skilled decision making via practical inductive reasoning skills (e.g., 
statistical numeracy and metacognition savviness) and elaborative heuristic deliberation. Both 
components of the mechanism theoretically help circumvent costly mistakes by employing 
metacognitive heuristics like double-checking an answer (Cokely et al., 2012; Ghazal et al., 
2014). The second mechanism allows for the generation of representative understanding of the 
decision problem, allowing an individual to intuitively judge the weight and potential 
consequences of various options and outcomes (Peters, 2012; Petrova et al., 2015; Petrova et al., 
2014). This understanding then informs the selection of adaptive heuristic strategies. For 
example, an individual potentially forms ecologically rational representations of cue validities 
and cue orderings that calibrate fast and frugal heuristic use to solve a decision task (Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). What do the mechanisms of Skilled Decision 
Theory mean for overconfidence bias?      
2.6 Risk Literacy and Overconfidence 
 
Research has demonstrated that risk literacy skills are predictive of reduced vulnerability to 
overconfidence (Ghazal, 2014; Ybarra et al., in-prep). The study by Ghazal et al. (2014) had 
highly educated individuals complete a statistical numeracy measure (The Berlin Numeracy 
Test; see Cokely et al., 2012) and an array of decision making tasks like financial choices or 
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medical judgments. Numeracy tended to be a predictor of decision making skills. Further, when 
assessing overprecision on a paradigmatic medical decision making problem, there was a 
positive correlation between numeracy and calibration. Sixty-five percent of highly numerate 
individuals were calibrated to their performance compared to forty-eight percent of low numerate 
individuals. Results revealed a curvilinear pattern of accuracy to confidence, resembling results 
like that in the “Unskilled and Unaware” literature (Dunning & Kruger, 1999). The authors 
concluded that the results were in line with the theoretical construct of numeracy (Skilled 
Decision Theory) that includes “1) a practical understanding of numbers and mathematical 
procedures, and 2) the skills necessary for effective problem solving and self-regulated learning”, 
meaning that general decision skills may help reduce overconfidence.   
A later study conducted by Ybarra et al. (in-prep) found that statistically numerate 
individuals were less overconfident for both overestimation and overplacement. In the study, 
participants from around the world answered a general bias blind spot question in addition to a 
battery of decision making tasks. Results indicated that numerate individuals tended to perform 
better on the decision making tasks and were more calibrated to their performance. Results 
showed a curvilinear relationship between confidence and general decision making skills, 
meaning that those lowest in skill were the most overconfident, those with some amount of skill 
were slightly overconfident or calibrated, and those with the most skill were calibrated or slightly 
underconfident. Further, structure equation models revealed that decision making skills mediated 
the relationship between numeracy and confidence calibration. That risk literacy played an 
essential role in mitigating the overconfidence bias. Moreover, Ghazal et al. (2014) and Ybarra et 
al. (in-prep) point out that general decision making skills like risk literacy are trainable skills. Is 
it the case that training risk literacy could reduce overconfidence bias?          
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2.7 Improving Risk Literacy: Visual Aids and Training 
 
Statistical numeracy tends to predict more resistance to a wide swath of decision making biases, 
including overconfidence bias. Unfortunately, a large proportion of individuals (including highly 
educated and intelligent working professionals) have relatively low levels of statistical numeracy 
(Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). Research has demonstrated that visual aids can help 
individuals better understand numerical expressions and probabilities (see Garcia-Retamero & 
Cokely, 2013, 2017). Figure 1 shows the general process model of skilled decision making and 
how visual aids and statistical numeracy relate. One study indicated that when participants 
completed a medical decision task that involved numerical information, highly numerate 
individuals could better solve the problem than less numerate individuals. However, providing 
less numerate individuals with a visual aid in addition to numerical information resulted in a 
similar performance to that of highly numerate individuals, increasing their accuracy to about 
60%. Further, in a 2015 study by Garcia-Retamero et al., participants had to make confidence 
judgments about their performance on medical decision tasks with or without a visual aid. 
Participants given a visual aid tended to perform better on the tasks and were also less 
overconfident in their performance, no matter their statistical numeracy. People generally saw 










Figure from Cokely et al. (2018) 
Note. The generalized structural process model of skilled decision making from Cokely et al. 
(2018).    
 Some researchers have defined graph literacy as the ability to understand graphically 
presented information (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011). Graph literacy involves interpreting 
visual aids like bar charts, pie charts, line plots, decision trees, and icon arrays. Unfortunately, 
generally effective graphical aids may still be challenging for many people to understand. An 
estimated 15% of U.S. adults, or about 40 million, roughly equivalent to the population of 
California, misinterpret features like the height of simple bar charts (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 
2011; see also: Okan et al., 2012, 2018; Terry & Ybarra, 2020), which means that tens of 
millions of potentially vulnerable individuals cannot understand important risk information from 
visual aids created to improve decisions related to high-stakes medical, educational, financial, 
and natural hazards.  
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 To help individuals understand risk literacy an online tutor was constructed that trained 
important general decision making skills via graph literacy (Woller-Carter, 2015). The relatively 
brief (approximately 2-hour) training helped people understand and interpret graphs like the ones 
used for visual aids. A controlled experiment indicated that participants improved in graph 
literacy by about one standard deviation after taking the tutor, while participants in the control 
condition saw no improvements. Further, individuals who completed the risk literacy tutor also 
improved resistance to decision biases like framing effects, ratio bias, and sunk costs. To 
emphasize, after individuals completed the risk tutor, people improved in decision making for 
tasks that did not include any visual aid. The question remains whether participants who took the 
tutor also built resistance to the overconfidence bias.  
To summarize, avoiding overconfidence is essential for behaviors and processes related 
to decision making, skill attainment, education, ethics, and self-regulation. Efforts to reduce 
overconfidence have led to mixed results, and some researchers believe that training 
overconfidence may not be possible (Kahneman, 2011). Additionally, there is evidence that 
overconfidence is not improved by nor related to general skills, experience, or knowledge 
(Dunning et al., 2004, Scopelliti et al., 2015). However, these efforts tended not to use measures 
related to risk literacy skills. Evidence has shown that risk literacy is a trainable skill predictive 
of better decision making and less overconfidence bias. Can causally training risk literacy skills 







Chapter 3: Methods 
3.1 Tutor Construction  
The tutor construction and reconstruction were part of an NSF-funded project designed to assess 
and improve general decision making skills. Previously, the team at riskliteracy.org created a 
suite of brief online risk literacy and risk communication training modules intended for use by 
diverse adults from industrialized countries. The first completed module, validated via scientific 
control trials, is a graph literacy training program (for a complete review, see Woller-Carter, 
2015). The initial tutor's construction followed well-established standards in intelligent tutoring 
and was programmed using Adobe Flash and Carnegie Mellon's Cognitive Tutor Authoring 
Tools (CTAT) (Aleven et al., 2006, 2009). The same principles and standards were applied 
during the tutor's reconstruction, though it was rebuilt from the ground up in Python rather than 
in Flash and CTAT (tutor.lolevo.com; Ybarra et al., 2018). 
   One primary goal in renovating the risk tutor was to increase the graph tutor's flexibility 
without designing wholly new projects. The tutor was programmed in Python using Flask as the 
web framework to achieve desired flexibility and reduce programming time. There are many 
potential benefits of using Python and Flask. Flask is a web framework that does not require 
specific libraries for form validation, database connectivity, or other relevant tools associated 
with developing and using a web application. Flask allowed for a lightweight backend that could 
be customized easily compared to heftier web frameworks like Django. One outcome of these 
advantages was the created browser-based question editor that allowed instantaneous changes to 





In-Browser Question Editor 
Note. The created in-browser question editor. This tool can be accessed from any online browser. 
The editor allows for quick question and hint editing. The editor also paved the way for an in-
browser tool to allow anyone to make online risk interventions. This tool is still in development. 
3.2 Procedure  
The design of the experiment was a one-way independent samples design.1 Random assignment 
placed all participants in either the control or tutor condition. Both conditions consisted of two 
phases, the first taken in the laboratory and the second completed at home. All pre-testing and 
training were in the lab and lasted approximately three hours. The tutor condition had selected 
 
1 Due to programming issues and significant attrition of participants from noncompliance, the originally conducted 
third condition was excluded. For more information see appendix.   
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post-test measures completed immediately after training. Phase 2 was completed approximately 
2-4 weeks after Phase 1. The participants were sent the link for Phase 2 two weeks after Phase 1 
but could complete the post-test at their own pace. Instructions asked participants to complete 
Phase 2 in one sitting after opening the link. Debriefing occurred after Phase 2.  
 The control condition was a financial literacy video tutor series that educated participants 
on long-term investing, retirement savings, and financial decision making. The videos were all 
from khanacademy.org's investments and retirement unit. Selection criteria for the control 
condition content included proven relevance to future life outcomes (e.g., healthy retirement) and 
domain-specific elements related to decision making and numeracy. In other words, the control 
was not to interfere with training general risk literacy skills but needed to be one of those 
domains that the risk literacy tutor could improve (Skagerlund et al., 2018). 
 The risk tutor condition was the online risk literacy tutor aimed at training specific risk 
literacy skills (e.g., graph literacy). The participant first completed a pre-test that asked for 
necessary graph information (e.g., pie charts add up to 100%). Next, the participant completed 
two different graph training modules. The first module of the tutor trained participants on 
interpreting data by displaying a problem involving probability that could be visualized and 
having the participant choose the appropriate visual aid. The second had participants construct a 
visual aid for several types of probabilistic problems and then choose the best constructed visual 
aid from an array of graphs. At each stage of the tutor, the participant had to select the correct 
answer to proceed. Exhaustive hints were available for the participants at their request; for a 






Procedure for the Tutor Condition 
 
 
Note. The top blue flowchart shows how students solved the first type of problem presented in 
the risk tutor. This part of the tutor emphasized identifying the type of data in the presented 
problem (e.g., continuous vs. categorical) and having the participant match that to the correct 
graph. The bottom green flowchart shows how students solved the second type of problem, 
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Initial Graph Overview 
Note. Screenshot of the initial graph overview. The pre-test explained each graph type, and then 
base knowledge was assessed in a multiple-choice format (e.g., "What type of graph uses 











First Module of Risk Tutor 
 
Note. Screenshot of a problem from the first module of the risk literacy tutor. This module had 
individuals interpret and classify data found in a decision making problem. The participant then 











Second Module of Risk Tutor 
 
Note. Screenshot of the second module of the risk literacy tutor. This module had participants 
construct a visual aid for a decision making problem by choosing the graph's values (e.g., axis 
value, pie chart values). Finally, the participant selected the best constructed visual aid from an 
array of visual aids, all similar.  
3.3 Pre-test measures 
 
Berlin Numeracy Test-S. Statistical numeracy was measured using the Berlin Numeracy 
Test (see RiskLiteracy.org; Cokely et al., 2012). Following best practice recommendations, the 
non-adaptive, 7-item Berlin Numeracy Test-S (BNT-S) – which includes three questions from 
Schwartz et al. (1997) – was used to increase sensitivity measuring those who may be less 
skilled. One example of a question includes, "Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 
times... out of 50 throws, what proportion will result in an odd number?"  
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Subjective Numeracy Scale. Fagerlin and colleagues (2007) created an 8-item scale that 
asked participants to rate their skills working with numeric information subjectively (e.g., "How 
good are you at working with fractions?") and their preferences for risk information (e.g., "When 
reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that are parts of a story?"). 
The measure often has correlations with objective numeracy (of varying sizes) and is sometimes 
used as a substitute for objective measures. The pre-test observed participants' proclivity to be 
overconfident in (specifically to overestimate) their numerical and risk literacy skills.  
Graph Construction Knowledge. The Graph Construction Knowledge Scale attempted 
to create a graph literacy pre-test focused on assessing the correct use of graphs in different 
situations. Item construction used research on graph literacy and appropriate construction of 
visual aids (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). Questions 
aimed to measured knowledge related to the correct application of specific types of graphs to 
different situations (e.g., "When using a bar graph which situation/goal is most appropriate for its 
use?").  
Subjective Graph Literacy. Garcia-Retamero et al. (2016) created the Subjective Graph 
Literacy scale to robustly predict objective graph literacy and quickly assess risk communication 
preferences.  Questions asked participants subjectively how skilled they are with various types of 
graphs (e.g., "How good are you at working with bar charts?"). The scale's inclusion in the pre-
test allowed for observation of participants' proclivity to be overconfident in their graph literacy. 
This measure was also used in the post-test to see if an individual's subjective skill in using 




3.4 Post-test measures  
 
Graph Literacy Scale. The Graph Literacy Scale developed by Galesic and Garcia-
Retamero (2011) consisted of 12 questions that presented participants with a visual aid and had 
them 1) read the data, 2) read between the data (compare parts of the visual aid), and 3) read 
beyond the data (make inferences from the visual aid). As detailed in Woller-Carter (2015), an 
additional four questions from various sources were asked to add sensitivity for those skilled in 
graph literacy due to the use of an educated sample.   
Visualizable Decision Tasks. The tasks from Ybarra et al. (2018) measured three 
different biases that are theoretically related to graph literacy skills, according to the results of 
Woller-Carter (2015). The three biases measured were framing effects, sunk cost bias, and ratio 
bias. Overestimation confidence questions ("How confident are you that you are correct in your 
answers?") were included for each of the three biases and used a 1 (not confident at all) to 10 
(completely confident) Likert scale (Ybarra, 2018). Overprecision confidence questions ("Out of 
the five problems, how many did you answer correctly?") were included for the sunk cost and 
ratio bias questions (Ybarra, 2018).  
Financial Literacy. The financial literacy questions created by Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007) measure financial knowledge related to economic behaviors like saving for retirement. 
The measure included assessing basic math skills related to investing, such as calculating the 
amount accumulated from interest rates. The measure also included more sophisticated financial 
literacy measures from Lusardi et al. (2014) that assess specific knowledge related to investing, 
such as knowing that stocks are generally riskier than bonds.     
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Bias Blind Spot. Twenty-three questions assessing bias blind spot consisted of fourteen 
questions constructed by Scopelliti et al. (2015) and nine questions created by Ybarra (2018). 
Ybarra (2018) found that the Bias Blind Spot scale created by Scopelliti et al. (2015) was a 
measure of social bias overconfidence (specifically overplacement) that was independent of 
more cognitive items. Question structure consisted of describing what the bias is, then measured 
an individual's propensity to believe themselves less biased than others by asking, "How biased 
are you?" and "How biased is the average individual?", then having participants rate each 
question on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (Scopelliti et al., 2015). The 
measure was scored by taking the difference between the subjective rating of average 
individuals' bias and subtracting the subjective rating of one's own bias. Next, the differences for 
the three biases were averaged to give an individual's final bias blind spot score indicative of an 





Pre- and Posttest Measures.     
                              
Note. A chart of all pre-test and post-test measures.2 
3.5 Participants  
A total of 273 University of Oklahoma students completed a 4-hour experiment in exchange for 
class credit (66% Female; age ranged from 18-22 years old). The final sample is derived from 
individuals who completed both the in-lab and at-home portions, completed the full tutor, and 
completed over 50% of the at-home portion.  
 
 
2 All scales marked with an * indicate that in the tutor condition these measures were given immediately after the 
tutor.  































Chapter 4: Analyses and Results 
4.1 Pre-test Results  
The purpose of this first analysis is to determine if there exists any significant difference in pre-
test measures between conditions. The sample showed average statistical numeracy levels 
compared to previous studies for college-aged participants (Table 2; Allan, 2018; Ybarra, 2018). 
On average, participants answered 3 out of 7 numeracy questions correctly. A one-way ANOVA 




 Risk Tutor 
(n = 138) 
Control 
(n = 135) 
 Maximum Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Berlin Numeracy Test - S 7 3.08 (1.41) 3.36 (1.77) 
Graph Construction Knowledge 11 4.46 (1.63) 4.66 (1.80) 
Subjective Graph Literacy 6 4.34 (0.98) 4.45 (0.85) 


















Note. Shows bar charts of pre-test measures. There are no significant differences between 
groups. Measures are z-scored and the error bars represent standard error.  
 
4.2 Post-test Results  
The purpose of the following analyses is to determine if there is any significant difference in 
post-test measures. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for post-test measures. 
First, a one-way ANOVA analysis revealed no significant differences for basic financial literacy, 
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though there was a significant difference in sophisticated financial literacy where the control 
condition performed better (F (1, 272) = 7.79, p = .006; Figure 9).  
Next, group differences in graph literacy were assessed (Figure 10). A difference score of 
pre-and post-test graph literacy was computed using the difference in scores for both the graph 
construction scale and graph literacy scale at pre-and post-testing. There was a significant 
between-group difference for graph literacy, via one-way ANOVA, in that the risk tutor 
condition had significantly larger pre-post differences (F (1, 272) = 4.03, p = .046, d = .42). One-
way ANCOVA results determined a statistically significant difference between the risk tutor and 
control conditions on the post-test Graph Literacy Scale controlling for statistical numeracy 
(BNT-S). There was a significant increase in Graph Literacy Scale scores after completing the 
risk tutor (F (2, 270) = 5.54, p = .019, R2 = .27). 
Group differences in visualizable decision making task performance were analyzed 
(Figure 11). Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations between conditions for post-test 
measures. A composite score was created by adding standardized values for ratio bias, framing 
effects, and sunk cost bias. A one-way ANCOVA determined a statistically significant difference 
between the risk tutor and control conditions on the visualizable decision making tasks 
controlling for statistical numeracy. There was a significant increase in performance on 








Post-test Measures Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 Risk Tutor 
 (n = 138) 
Control  
(n = 135) 
 Maximum Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Berlin Numeracy Test - 
Components  
9 
3.08 (1.74) 3.50 (2.38) 
Graph Literacy  16 12.40 (2.09) 12.05 (2.45) 
        Graph Literacy - 
Hard Items  
4 





            Ratio Bias  5 2.93 (1.59) 2.77 (1.58) 
            Sunk Cost 5 3.18 (1.15) 3.04 (1.29) 
            Framing 3 1.35 (0.87) 1.13 (0.91) 
Financial Literacy    
           Basic   4 2.29 (1.20) 2.35 (1.31) 
           Sophisticated  8 2.66 (1.92) 3.31 (1.94) 














Condition Differences in Financial Literacy 
  
Note. Posttest between-group differences on sophisticated financial literacy. There was a 
significant group mean difference for sophisticated financial literacy between the control 
condition and the risk tutor condition via one-way ANOVA (F (1, 272) = 7.79, p = .006). 
Participants in the control financial literacy condition tended to score better on sophisticated 
literacy questions, which asked questions about domain-specific financial knowledge (e.g., 
"What are riskier of the two? Stocks or bonds?"). Measures are z-scored and the error bars 












Note. The image displays within-group pre-post differences between conditions on the pre-test 
graph construction measure and the post-test Graph Literacy Scale. There was a significant group 
mean difference for changes in pre-post graph literacy. Results indicated that participants who 
completed the two-hour risk literacy tutor causally improved in graph literacy compared to the 




Condition Differences in Visualizable Decision Making 
                                                 
Note. The graph shows group post-test differences between conditions on visualizable decision 
tasks. Results indicated that participants who completed the risk tutor performed better on the 
visualizable decision making tasks (Sunk cost, ratio bias, and framing effects) than participants 
in the control condition. Results indicated that training general risk literacy skills improve 








4.3 Post-test confidence results   
Finally, group differences for the three types of overconfidence bias were analyzed. 
Overplacement was first analyzed. A one-way ANCOVA found no statistically significant 
difference between the risk tutor and control conditions on the post-test bias blind spot measures 
for the visualizable decision making biases controlling for statistical numeracy (BNT-S). Ybarra 
et al. (in-prep) showed that better decision making performance was positively related to the bias 
blind spot. A similar multiple regression path analysis was constructed to observe if the tutor led 
to differences in the bias blind spot (Figure 12). Path analyses indicated a significant positive 
relationship between visualizable decision making task performance and cognitive bias blind 














Risk Literacy Training and the Bias Blind Spot  
 
                                                               
Note. Top: There was a significant, but small effect for the differences in overplacement for the 
visualizable decision making tasks as seen in the bar chart. Bottom: A structural equation model 
estimated the amount that the tutor and risk literacy skills mediated the relationship, controlling 
for numeracy, with bias blind spot (e.g., overplacement for the visualizable decision making 
tasks). The model is in line with previous research with the bias blind spot and risk literacy (see 
Ybarra et al., in-prep) and has good fit χ2 (1) = 4.13, CFI = .97, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .10 (0.01 – 
0.22), SRMR = 0.03, R2 = .19.  
aWithin figure, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01.  
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A one-way ANCOVA determined a statistically significant difference between the risk 
tutor and control conditions on the post-test overestimation measures for the visualizable 
decision making tasks controlling for statistical numeracy (BNT-S). There was a significant 
decrease in posttest overestimation after completing the risk tutor controlling for pretest 
numeracy (F (2, 269) = 7.94, p = .005, R2 = .03). A second one-way ANCOVA indicated a 
significant decrease in posttest overprecision for the sunk cost and ratio bias visualizable 
decision making tasks (F (2, 270) = 5.91, p = .016, R2 = .02). Figure 13 shows a summary of 
group differences for overestimation and overprecision for both conditions.  
 Table 4 
Overprecision and Overestimation on the Visualizable Decision Making Tasks 
  
Risk Tutor 
 (n = 138) 
Control    
       (n = 135) 
Overconfidence Max. Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Ratio Bias Overprecision 5 0.77 (1.42) 1.10 (1.71) 
Ratio Bias Overestimation   10 0.99 (2.95) 1.59 (3.46) 
Sunk Cost Overprecision 5 1.39 (1.85) 1.86 (1.88) 
Sunk Cost Overestimation  10 1.87 (3.01) 2.21 (2.85) 
Framing Overestimation  10 2.60 (2.88) 3.75 (3.08) 












Condition Differences in Overconfidence 
     
 
 
Note. The top image shows between-condition differences in overconfidence for the visualizable 
decision tasks. The left, middle, and bottom two images show the significant group mean 
differences between the control and the risk tutor conditions while controlling for statistical 
numeracy for overprecision and overestimation. The risk tutor tends to causally predict lower 
overconfidence for all visualizable decision biases (ratio bias, sunk cost, and framing). The right 
middle and bottom two images show overprecision and overestimation ratings across levels of 
statistical numeracy. The risk tutor condition shows predicted means of lower overconfidence for 




A path analysis evaluated how the risk tutor changes confidence judgments. The path 
analysis predicted confidence using the risk tutor, graph literacy, and objective visualizable 
decision skill as predictors while controlling for statistical numeracy (Figure 14 shows the whole 
model).  
Figure 14 
Path Analysis of How the Tutor Predicts Confidence Judgments 
 
Note. The above structural equation model shows the tutor's effect on graph literacy, visualizable 
decision making task performance, and confidence judgments. The model showed good fit: χ2 
(3) = 6.60, CFI = .98, TLI = .94, RMSEA = .06 (0.00 – 0.13), SRMR = 0.03. Those in the risk 
tutor condition tended to improve in graph literacy, R2 = .28. Graph literacy (measured via the 
graph literacy scale) predicted better visualizable decision making task performance, R2 = .20. 
Higher visualizable decision making task performance mediated higher confidence judgments 
("How confident are you that you are correct?"), indicating better calibration, R2 = .13. Statistical 
numeracy predicted higher graph literacy, visualizable task performance, and confidence. The 
model implies that training graph literacy leads to better decision making task performance and 
accurate confidence judgments. Further, general risk literacy skills are predictive of superior 
decision making performance but also better self-evaluations.3 





3 The model shown above was chosen for both theoretical and statistical reasons. Graph literacy must come after the 
risk tutor as it is the trained effect. It was believed from Skilled Decision Theory and previous studies (Woller-
Carter, 2015) that untrained, objective decision skills would be improved by risk literacy skills like graph literacy. 
The improved skill then would, theoretically, then change self-evaluations. For competing models see Appendix D.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion 
 
The study presented here is the first experiment to test if training general risk literacy skills (e.g., 
graph literacy) helps individuals avoid the overconfidence bias on various decision making and 
self-evaluation tasks (framing effects, ratio bias, sunk cost, overconfidence bias). The results 
presented here suggested that training graph literacy skills causally improves performance on 
conceptually distinct decision making tasks that involve visualizable, graph-relevant elements. 
Individuals who complete training via the risk literacy tutor also tended to be less overconfident 
in their decision making task performance across many classes of self-evaluation judgments, 
consistent with Skilled Decision Theory (Cokely et al., 2018). Findings extend upon similar 
research by Morewedge et al. (2015) that showed improvements in one type of overconfidence, 
overplacement, via training specific decision biases (Symborski et al., 2014; 2016). Findings 
from the Morewedge et al. (2015) study and this study are inconsistent with previous results that 
appeared to suggest that overconfidence was untrainable and therefore was not likely to be 
related to individual differences in self-evaluation judgments more generally (Kahneman, 2011). 
In contrast, the current results of the first experimental test of risk literacy skills training revealed 
that general decision making skills are often robustly causally related to accurate metacognitive 
judgments (e.g., cognitive self-evaluations and social comparisons). In sum: 
1. Risk literacy skills are self-evaluation skills, 
2. Self-evaluation is a general, trainable skill, and 




5.2 Risk Literacy Skills Promote Accurate Self-Evaluations 
 
How are individuals improving in their self-evaluations? One theory is that the tutor provides 
individuals with strategies and general decision making skills to understand better and evaluate 
the knowledge that helps inform self-evaluations. The tutor could help individuals create better 
problem representations in their long-term memory (Ghazal et al., 2014). Having a deeper 
representative understanding may help avoid biased intuitions, allowing for accurate cognitive 
monitoring (see Mitchum & Kelley, 2010; Cokely, Kelley, and Gilchrist, 2006). This process 
may result in the individuals having better strategy selection which is crucial for task 
performance (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The better strategy could result in a more accurate 
confidence judgment as it theoretically indicates the validity of the chosen strategy as postulated 
by the probabilistic mental model theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). 
Another possible theory is that individuals incorporate feedback from the tutor into their 
self-evaluations (Arkes et al., 1987; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Sitzman, Rhodes, & Tauber, 
2014). The tutor provides individuals feedback on their performance on problems that may share 
identical elements with the visualizable decision making tasks (framing effects, ratio bias, sunk 
cost). For instance, if a student is doing poorly on the tutor, and the tutor communicates this to 
the student, the student may use that feedback in their confidence judgment (e.g., “The way I am 
solving this task is wrong”; Koriat, 2012; Moore & Healy, 2008). Perhaps, though, the individual 
makes a personal judgment related to their overall skill (e.g., “I am bad at ratio bias problems”). 
Koriat (2012) claims that "confidence is modeled by analogy to the calculation of statistical level 
of confidence (SLC) in testing hypotheses about a population and represents the participant's 
assessment of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice." Koriat claims that 
confidence monitors reliability, not validity, in choices which means that self-evaluations are 
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sensitive to variance and number of experiences (i.e., sample size). In either theoretical case (the 
probabilistic mental model or the self-consistency model), self-evaluations could be based on 
more coherent representative understanding derived from the problem’s cues via risk literacy 
skills. The feedback from the tutor may have enriched the experiences and knowledge used to 
make accurate confidence judgments. This claim assumes the tutor improved self-evaluation skill 
and not just decision making task performance. 
5.3 Self-Evaluation is a General, Trainable Skill 
 
One concern is that the resulting change in overconfidence is driven only by those who improve 
in task performance, like the effects found in the “Unskilled and Unaware” literature (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Sanchez & 
Dunning, 2018). Looking closer at the data, individuals who took the risk literacy tutor tended to 
calibrate their confidence judgments across all skill levels (Figure 15). For example, confidence 
calibration curves for the ratio bias decision tasks showed a curvilinear relationship between 
confidence and accuracy in both conditions. Comparing the quadratic regression results for ratio 
bias showed that low-skilled individuals in the control condition were more overconfident than 
those in the risk tutor condition. The results imply that the lower-skilled individuals in the 
training condition seemed to be “Unskilled, but aware” (Miller & Geraci, 2011; Hartwig & 
Dunlosky, 2014). Calibration may be due to improved sensitivity to task performance as people 
generally improved in self-evaluations, but not actual performance, lending evidence to the idea 
of skilled self-evaluations (Cokely et al., 2018; Ericsson et al., 2007; 2018; Gigerenzer, 2015). 









Note. Two confidence calibration curves demonstrating the difference between conditions, where 
the blue line demonstrates perfect calibration. Overprecision is decreased for all individuals who 
completed the risk tutor including those lower in accuracy, as seen in the quadratic regression (F 
(1, 2) = 23.32, p < .001, R2 = .26), compared to those in the control condition (F (1, 2) = 9.01, p 









4 There was a significant mean difference for low ratio bias task performing individuals (Control: M = 2.31, SD = 
1.59; Risk Tutor: M = 1.74, SD = 1.19), via t-test, between conditions for ratio bias overprecision  t(114) = 2.18, p = 
.03.  Results indicated that there was significant reduction in overconfidence, but not necessarily improvement in 
performance, meaning that training risk literacy skills may improve self-evaluations. Further, there does not seem to 
be signs of an interaction with individuals with pre-test graph literacy, nor statistical numeracy. This indicates that, 
if results are representative and can generalize, all individuals who complete the tutor, no matter their prior skill, 
could improve in decision making and self-evaluation skills. For analyses looking at potential interactions see 
appendix D.   
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5.4 Two Hours of Graph Literacy Training Potentially can Improve Decision Making 
 
To the extent that the results generalize, these findings appear to have many implications for 
diverse issues across social, moral, ethical, organizational, and educational contexts5.  For 
example, research suggests that accurate self-evaluations can be associated with the quality of 
ethical decision making in several ways (Feltz & Cokely, 2018; Mumford et al., 2008).  
Moreover, the work of Koriat et al. (2020) suggests these confidence biases and judgments may 
be related to many evaluative social judgments about people’s personalities, social beliefs, social 
attitudes, and other personal preferences.  
Differences in overconfidence biases are also known to weigh on organizational 
psychology in many ways.  For example, some research finds that self-evaluations may be 
crucial for many decisions within organizations.  More specifically, Russo and Schoemaker 
(1992) have discussed how overconfidence, especially in managers and other leaders, has 
consequences that can be associated with financial loss or even catastrophic disasters (Ben-David 
et al., 2013; Grant, 2021; Moore, 2020; Tetlock & Gardner, 2016). For example, there is broad 
agreement that overconfidence in lead engineers' decision making likely played a major role in 
the oilwell blowout and subsequent explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig (Labib & Read, 
2010).  These bias-related effects have also been observed in simulator-based research on 
offshore blowouts, revealing that higher confidence judgments do not necessarily reflect 
 
5 One example showing the importance of overconfidence can be found in the 2019 article by Peters et al. that 
measured objective and subjective numeracy in patients with systematic lupus erythematosus (SLE). Results 
indicated that SLE patients overconfident in their numeracy skills often reported higher disease activity. 
Extrapolating the results of the graph literacy tutor and the effect size in reducing overconfidence to the results of 
Peters et al. (2019), the completion of the two-hour risk literacy tutor could lead to decreased disease activity. The 
reported half a standard deviation improvements in overconfidence gained from the tutor could lead to the 
approximate reduction of disease activity of a low numerate individual to one more in line with someone double in 
objective numeracy, leading to potentially better health. 
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overconfident errors but can be robustly related to better blowout control, potentially preventing 
catastrophic damage (Raza et al., 2018).   
Beyond these few training examples, perhaps the largest potential opportunity for 
developing more advanced training applications is found within educational (K-12) and post-
secondary educational contexts. While these are far beyond this paper's current scope, it bears 
mentioning that the state-of-the-science of self-regulated learning often emphasizes roles 
involving appropriate monitoring and control strategy selections. However, research on self-
regulated learning often generally neglects what may be very robust roles of individual 
differences in metacognitive skills related to risk literacy (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; 
Zimmerman, 2000). Relatedly, the development of superior, verifiable expertise (i.e., expert 
performance) often depends significantly on accurate self-evaluations to inform the development 
of challenging and accurate goals as required to promote continuous skill attainment (Ericsson & 
Lehman, 1996). Self-evaluation skills may be especially pertinent with the continuing pivot to 
online education, particularly as some online tutors have a “hint” function that asks users to 
make metacognitive judgments on a question-to-question basis if they need help (Aleven & 
Koedinger, 2002; Aleven et al., 2003). However, it is noteworthy that there are currently no 
standards and minimal research on mining, designing, and implementing feedback in the form of 




“It is wise to take admissions of uncertainty seriously, but declarations of high confidence 
mainly tell you that an individual has constructed a coherent story in his mind, not necessarily 
that the story is true.” -Daniel Kahneman Thinking Fast and Slow (2011).  
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The current state-of-the-science of overconfidence often rests on untested assumptions 
like those expressed in the quote above. Unfortunately, it is risky to assume that people are 
biased without objective evidence simply because they express high confidence in their abilities 
or relative competencies. To illustrate some relevant concerns, consider one typical example 
offered as clear evidence of ubiquitous overconfidence: most individuals believe themselves to 
be better than the average drivers, a statistical impossibility given the assumption of a normal 
distribution of drivers (Svenson, 1981). In this often-cited example of the “better-than-average 
effect,” researchers explicitly assume that this effect must reflect biases, suggesting that, 
logically, most people cannot be above average.  Ironically, however, this assumption is not false 
unless distributions are perfectly normal.  After all, most people will be above average drivers if 
the distribution of the population of drivers is skewed (e.g., if a small number of drivers are 
responsible for most accidents, most people will have fewer accidents than average). When 
looking at individual differences in objective driving skills, there is often a robust positive 
relationship between confidence in one’s driving skills and objectively measured performance 
(Groeger, 2001; Victoir et al., 2005). Furthermore, research shows that educational interventions 
focused on driver risk perceptions could reduce biases and overconfidence (Deery, 1999). 
 To further illustrate related methodological concerns, consider the fact that in the U.S., 
most people have below-average income levels, in that the average U.S. income is almost twice 
as high as the median U.S. income (e.g., because the top 1% makes almost as much money as the 
bottom 50% most people must have below-average incomes).  Ironically, however, even in cases 
where the population is perfectly normally distributed, about 50% of any randomly sampled 
group of participants who say they are “better than average” would be correct.  This finding 
would not imply that most people are biased and overconfident because, at maximum, only half 
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of the people could be overconfident.  There are many reasons to be concerned and skeptical 
about the value and meaning of “better-than-average” like effects.  Relatedly, many 
investigations of overconfidence assume that differences in group means reflect underlying 
cognitive processes, which often is not the case when individual data responses have been 
averaged or aggregated (e.g., if the average parent has 2.4 children, this does not imply that 
every parent has two whole children and one partial child). These and other kinds of untested or 
unjustifiable assumptions, often found in overconfidence research, can lead to many kinds of 
misinterpretations and should not be neglected in future research. 
Beyond helping to clarify some limitations of methods and theoretical interpretations of 
previous overconfidence research, the current findings may have implications for designing 
effective skill training programs, including implications for developing adaptive training 
technologies. For example, consider opportunities for integrating information about subjective 
confidence judgments as part of hint mining procedures (See appendix D, part 4). Because 
intelligent tutors often adapt to individuals' needs based on the factors that have benefited other 
similar people, differences in (valid and biased) subjective self-evaluation judgments may inform 
the evaluation and selection of various training hints.  To further illustrate, after completing a 
problem in an online tutor, a student might make a confidence judgment about that specific 
problem and then generate a hint to help other individuals and provide a confidence judgment 
about the value of that hint. The generated hints and subjective confidence judgments could then 
be reverse engineered to assess the extent, why, when, and how these judgments provide an 
essential index of the expected learning value of various hints for diverse learners. Of course, 
using subjective self-evaluation judgments to support hint mining operations is just one general 
example of the kinds of tools and insights that could follow from a more accurate assessment and 
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theoretical understanding of the nature of individual differences in subjective self-evaluation 
skills and overconfidence biases.  
Taken altogether, in contrast to the increasingly influential, high-profile claims 
suggesting that regardless of one’s skills, “everyone is overconfident,” the current results suggest 
that skills may generally protect people from many kinds of overconfidence biases across many 
kinds of cognitive tasks (Cokely et al., 2018; Feltz & Cokely, 2018; Ghazal et al., 2014; Okan et 
al., 2015; Peters, 2020; Petrova, Van de Pligt, Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Reyna et al., 2009; 2018; 
2020; Szaszi et al., 2017).  Consistent with Skilled Decision Theory, it appears that general risk 
literacy skills often causally give rise to general, trainable decision making skills and general, 
trainable metacognitive and self-evaluation skills. Notably, the discovery of the direct causal link 
between risk literacy skills and metacognitive skills appears to be the first such finding reported 
in the scientific literature.  While more research is needed, results suggest we should be 
relatively confident that people can improve their general self-evaluation skills by specifically 
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Pre-Test Measures and Tasks 
Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007).  
Item 7 is reverse scored, and the average of all items is the overall subjective numeracy. The average of 
items 1-4 comprises the abilities subscale. The average of items 5-8 comprises the preferences subscale. 
Higher scores mean higher skill levels. 
 
For each of the following questions, please check the box that best reflects how good you are at doing the 
following things: 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  
How good are 
you at working 
with fractions? 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How good are 
you at working 
with 
percentages? (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How good are 
you at 
calculating a 
15% tip? (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How good are 
you at figuring 
out how much a 
shirt will cost if 
it is 25% off? 
(4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
71 
 
For each of the following questions, please check the box that best reflects your answer: 
 
When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that are parts of a story? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
When people tell you the chance of something happening, do you prefer that they use words ("it rarely 
happens") or numbers ("there's a 1% chance")? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
When you hear a weather forecast, do you prefer predictions using percentages (e.g., “there will be a 20% 
chance of rain today”) or predictions using only words (e.g., “there is a small chance of rain today”)? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
How often do you find numerical information to be useful? 
 1  2  3  4  5  








Subjective Graph Literacy 
Below is the used 5-item subjective graph literacy scale. There is a full 10 item subjective graph literacy 
scale as detailed in Garcia-Retamero et al. (2016). This scale was also asked again in the post test to see if 
subjective graph proficiency changed after the intervention. 
Please respond to the following questions. 
 
1 - not at all 
good  
2  3  4  5  
6 - extremely 
good  
How good 




o  o  o  o  o  o  
How good 
are you at 
working with 
line plots? (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
How good 




o  o  o  o  o  o  
How good 
are you at 
inferring the 
size of a bar 
in a bar 
chart? (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
How good 




bars in a bar 
chart? (5)  





The additional 5 Subjective Graph Literacy Questions are as follows: 
6. How good are you at projecting a future trend from a line chart? (1 = not at all good; 6 = extremely 
good) 
7. Are graphs easier to understand than numbers? (1 = not at all; 6 = much easier) 
8. How often do you find graphical information to be useful? (1 = never; 6 = very often) 
9. To what extent do you believe in the saying ‘‘a picture is worth one thousand words’’? (1 = not at all; 6 
= extremely 
10. When reading books or newspapers, how helpful do you find graphs that are part of a story? (1 = not 






Graph Construction Knowledge. 
The created scale was used as a pseudo pre-test on graphical information.  
 
When using a bar graph which situation/goal is most appropriate for its use? 
o a. Communicate Information about Proportions   
o b. Compare Several Data Points   
o c. Depiction of Large Very Numbers   
o d. Communicate Treatment Risk Reduction or Risk of Side Effects   
o e. Trends Over Time   
 
When using a line graph which situation/goal is most appropriate for its use? 
o a. Communicate Information about Proportions   
o b. Compare Several Data Points   
o c. Depiction of Large Very Numbers   
o d. Communicate Treatment Risk Reduction or Risk of Side Effects   
o e. Trends Over Time   
 
When using a pie graph which situation/goal is most appropriate for its use? 
o a. Communicate Information about Proportions   
o b. Compare Several Data Points   
o c. Depiction of Large Very Numbers   
o d. Communicate Treatment Risk Reduction or Risk of Side Effects   




When using a grid which situation/goal is most appropriate for its use? 
o a. Communicate Information about Proportions   
o b. Compare Several Data Points   
o c. Depiction of Large Very Numbers   
o d. Communicate Treatment Risk Reduction or Risk of Side Effects   
o e. Trends Over Time   
 
When using an icon array which situation/goal is most appropriate for its use? 
o a. Communicate Information about Proportions   
o b. Compare Several Data Points   
o c. Depiction of Large Very Numbers   
o d. Communicate Treatment Risk Reduction or Risk of Side Effects   
o e. Trends Over Time   
 
When should shadows and truncated scales be used?  
o a. When the presented information is highly complex   
o b. When the presented information is very simple    
o c. When there are many data points being depicted   
o d. When there are few data points being depicted    





An Icon Array should depict both the _____ representing the numerator and the ____ representing the 
denominator. 
o a. Population at Risk, Affected Individuals    
o b. Affected individuals, Population at risk    
o c. Nontreated individuals, Treated individuals   
o d. Treated individuals, Nontreated individuals    
o e. Both b and d   
 
Visual aids are especially useful for people with… 
o a. People of low numeracy    
o b. People with high levels of education    
o c. Limited medical knowledge   
o d. Both a and c   
o e. All of the above   
 
Numerical information in visual aids should be framed using… 
o a. Decimals   
o b. Fractions    
o c. Frequencies    
o d. Percentages    




How should icon arrays be arranged? 
o a. In a Block    
o b. Random Scattering    
o c. From smallest to largest    
o d. From largest to smallest    
o e. Does not matter how the icons are arranged   
 
When using a graph with an axis (e.g bar/line graph) the y axis represents the _____ variable and the x 
axis represents the _____  
o a. Vertical, Horizontal    
o b. Horizontal, Vertical    
o c. Independent, Dependent    
o d. Dependent, Independent    
o e. None of the above   
 
A visual aid should always strive to be what above all else? 
o a. Attractive    
o b. Attention grabbing    
o c. Transparent    
o d. Complex   






Berlin Numeracy Test – S. 
The Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely et al., 2012) consists of 4 numeracy problems of increasing difficulty. 
An additional 3 items were included from the Schwartz (1997) numeracy scale to add a set of validated 
questions that individuals often find easier.     
 
You will now be asked to solve a few problems. Please note that you are allowed to enter numbers that 
include up to 2 decimal points (for example, 1.11). You are also welcome to use a calculator to help solve 
these problems. 
 
1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about how many times the coin 
would come up heads in 1,000 flips? (Schwartz, 1997) 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best guess 
about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG 
BUCKS? (Schwartz, 1997) 
3. In ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of 
tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? (Schwartz, 1997) 
4. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in a choir 
100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in a choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a 
randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Please indicate the probability as a percent. (Cokely et al., 
2012) 
5. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how many times 
would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)? (Cokely et al., 2012) 
6. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high 
as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70 throws how many times 
would the die show the number 6? (Cokely et al., 2012) 
7. In a forest, 20% of the mushrooms are red, 50% are brown, and 30% are white. A red mushroom is 
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a probability of 5%. 
What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red? Please indicate the probability as a 





Post-Test Measures and Tasks 
 
Graph Literacy Scale.  
Questions 1-13 are the original graph literacy scale (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011) and 14-
17 are the additional difficult items from the sources cited for each question. Correct responses 
are indicated in bold. The total score is the sum of correct responses. Higher scores mean higher 
skill levels. 
 
1. Here is some information about cancer therapies.  
What percentage of patients recovered after chemotherapy? __35__% 
 
2. Here is some information about cancer therapies.  
What is the difference between the percentage of patients who recovered after a surgery and the 




3. Here is some information about different forms of cancer.  
Of all the people who die from cancer, approximately what percentage dies from lung cancer? __25__% 
 
4. Here is some information about different forms of cancer.  
Approximately what percentage of people who die from cancer die from colon cancer, breast cancer, and 





5. Here is some information about an imaginary disease called Adeolitis.  
Approximately what percentage of people had Adeolitis in the year 2000? __20__% 
 
6. Here is some information about an imaginary disease called Adeolitis.  
When was the increase in the percentage of people with Adeolitis higher? [From 1975 to 1980, From 
2000 to 2005, Increase was the same in both intervals, Don’t know] 
 
 7. Here is some information about an imaginary disease called Adeolitis.  
According to your best guess, what will the percentage of people with Adeolitis be in the year 2010? 













8. The following figure shows the number of men and women among patients with disease X. The total 
number of circles is 100. 
Of 100 patients with disease X, how many are women? __40__ 
 
9. The following figure shows the number of men and women among patients with disease X. The total 
number of circles is 100. 





10. In a magazine you see two advertisements, one on page 5 and another on page 12. Each is for a 
different drug for treating heart disease, and each includes a graph showing the effectiveness of the drug 
compared to a placebo (sugar pill). 
Compared to the placebo, which treatment leads to a larger decrease in the percentage of patients who 





11. In the newspaper you see two advertisements, one on page 15 and another on page Each is for a 
different treatment of psoriasis, and each includes a graph showing the effectiveness of the treatment over 
time. 
Which of the treatments contributes to a larger decrease in the percentage of sick patients? 




12. Here is some information about the imaginary diseases Coliosis and Tiosis. 
Between 1980 and 1990, which disease had a higher increase in the percentage of people affected? 




13. Here is some information about cancer therapies. 





14. Below you can see information about Fireworks in the Netherlands. Graphs for question 14 of the 
graph literacy scale (Kirsch, 2001). 
 




15. Below you can see information concerning the World's major producers and consumers of primary 
energy. Graphs for question 15 of the graph literacy scale (Evetts, 2002). 
 








16. The graph below shows predictions of United States energy consumption through the year 2010. Use 
the graph to answer the question that follows. Graph for question 16 of the graph literacy scale (National 
Center for Education Statisics). 
 
In the year 2010, which energy source is predicted to supply a larger percentage of the total power than it 














17. Until the year 1994, the change rate in the income of Company B was... Graph for question 17 of the 
graph literacy scale (Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003). 
 
[Greater than the change rate in the income of Company A, Smaller than the change rate in the income 



















Visualizable Decision Making Tasks (Ybarra et al., 2018). 
Tasks were created and psychometrically assessed to give a measure of an individual’s skill at 
“visualizable” decision tasks. Each section is scored by adding up correct answers with higher numbers 
meaning more skill in that decision task. Bolded Answers are the correct answers 
 
1. Ratio Bias 
A. Imagine that you are presented with two bowls of folded tickets. One bowl contains 1 ticket marked 
"winner” and 9 blank tickets. The other bowl contains 10 tickets marked “winner” and 90 blank tickets. 
You must draw one ticket (without peeking, of course) from either bowl: If you draw a ticket marked 
“winner”, you win $10.00; otherwise, you win nothing and the game is over. If you were given the 
choice, which bowl would you choose from?  
o Bowl with 1 winning ticket   
o Bowl with 10 winning tickets   
o No preference   
 
B. Imagine a situation in which you are watching TV late one night when you are startled by the 
telephone ringing. The caller says he is a policeman with unfortunate news to report. You learn that the 
person you love most in your life has been in an automobile accident and is in critical in a hospital. In 
desperation, you rush to the hospital. When you arrive there, the physician in charge of the case informs 
you that your loved one is in a coma and needs an immediate blood transfusion. You are asked to choose 
between samples from two blood banks, both of which have a rate of HIV transmission that is barely 
acceptable, but they are the only samples available at the moment. One has a record of one HIV positive 
case out of a thousand transfusions, and the other has a record of ten HIV positive cases out of ten 
thousand transfusions. You know that the proportions are identical, but somehow you may feel that the 
chance of transmission is greater in one sample than in the other.  
  In which sample, if either, do you think there was a greater likelihood of HIV contamination?  
o Greater probability in 1,000 sample   
o Slightly greater probability in 1,000 sample   
o Same probability in both samples   
o Slightly greater probability in 10,000 sample   




C. Suppose you are faced with two trays of jellybeans, one of which contained 10 beans and one with 
100. In each , you must draw one jellybean without peeking, of course, from either tray. Should you pick 
a black jelly bean, you will win $50, Should you pick a white jellybean, you will win nothing.  
  Now, what makes your choice interesting is that for each time you choose, both trays will offer identical 
odds of selecting a black jellybean. Still, many (but not all) people have a preference for picking one of 
the trays. Your job is to indicate whether you would prefer to pick from the large tray (100 beans), the 
small tray (10 beans) or if you have no preference.  
o Tray with 10 jelly beans   
o No preference   
o Tray with 100 jelly beans   
 
D. You are informed by a new study of the WHO (World Health Organization) that, in Peru, the risk for a 
woman to be a victim of domestic violence by her partner is 40 in 100. Women are also likely to 
experience verbal abuse, which is a form of abuse in which a partner says harsh words to bully and 
belittle a person. Another form of verbal abuse is silent, in which a person acts as if their partner does not 
exist. Women have a 2 in 5 chance of experiencing verbal abuse. Is domestic violence or verbal abuse a 
bigger problem in Peru? 
 
o Domestic abuse is significantly bigger problem   
o Domestic abuse is a slightly bigger problem   
o Problems have same magnitude   
o Verbal abuse is a slightly bigger problem   
o Verbal abuse is a significantly bigger problem   
 
E. You have a coupon for two different pizza places. In both locations, a large pizza is $10. For Norman 
Pizzeria, you can save 20% on one pizza. At Paul’s Pizza, you receiving $2 off each pizza when you order 
two pizzas. At which pizza place will you save the largest percent of money?     
o Norman Pizzeria   
o You will save the same amount at both pizza places   




Out of the above questions, how many do you think you got right?  
o 1   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
 
How confident are you that your previous answers are correct? 
o 1 - Not confident at all   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5 - Half confident the answers are correct   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   





2. Sunk Cost 
 
A. Imagine on your way home you buy a tv dinner on sale for $3 at the local grocery store. A few hours 
later you decide it is time for dinner, so you get ready to put the tv dinner in the oven. Then you get an 
idea. You call up your friend to ask if he would like to come over for a quick tv dinner and then watch a 
good movie on tv. Your friend says “Sure.” So you go out to buy a second tv dinner. However, all the on-
sale tv dinners are gone. You therefore have to spend $5 (the regular price) for the tv dinner identical to 
the one you just bought for $3. You go home and put both dinners in the oven. When the two dinners are 
fully cooked, you get a phone call. Your friend is ill and cannot come. You are not hungry enough to eat 
both dinners. You cannot freeze one. You must eat one and discard the other. Which one do you eat?  
o $3 dinner   
o $5 dinner   
o no preference   
 
B. Agatha decides after careful consideration that she wants to take cello lessons. Agatha spends $1,000 
on a beginner cello and an additional $200 on the first 3 months of cello lessons. After 3 months of 
lessons, Agatha realizes that she no longer enjoys the cello and wants to stop taking lessons. It is almost 
certain that if she signs up for more lessons, she will not enjoy them and will never enjoy playing the 
cello. What should Agatha do?  
o Agatha should stop taking cello lessons because it would be a waste of time and money to 
take more lessons that she won't enjoy   
o Agatha should continue with the lessons because otherwise she will have wasted the money and 
time already spent   
o Agatha should continue lessons to teach herself that next time she should be more careful about 
what hobbies she selects for herself   
o Agatha should continue with the lessons because if she was foolish enough to select a hobby that 
she doesn't enjoy, she deserves to suffer by continuing with her lessons   
o Agatha should continue with the lessons. If she stops taking lessons, that would mean she made a 
bad decision in deciding to take cello lessons.... If it was the right decision then, it is still the right 





C. Imagine that your credit card company selects you to win a free weekend cruise to Macau in exchange 
for some market research that you must participate in. The research involves participation in focus groups 
and questionnaires- it takes a total of about 12 hours spread over two weeks. You participated in the 
research and collected your free ticket to the cruise. However, a couple of days before the cruise you get 
invited to an all-expenses paid weekend trip to Bangkok for the same weekend as the cruise. You would 
love to visit Bangkok, but have also really been looking forward to this cruise. How likely are you to go 
on the cruise? 
o Extremely likely   
o Moderately likely   
o Slightly likely   
o Neither likely nor unlikely   
o Slightly unlikely   
o Moderately unlikely   




D. You go to the bar, on the spur of the moment, and buy a pitcher of beer for $6.95. You finish the beer 
and then decide to buy a second pitcher of beer for the same price. But after a few sips you feel you had 
too much to drink. No one else wants to drink it. How likely are you to keep drinking the rest of pitcher? 
o Extremely likely   
o Moderately likely   
o Slightly likely   
o Neither likely nor unlikely   
o Slightly unlikely   
o Moderately unlikely   
o Extremely unlikely   
 
E. You purchase a 3-month supply of weight loss products for $200. When you try the product, you 
discover that it tastes horribly, but you still take use it everyday because you really want to lose 
weight.  The box says you should see results within 6 weeks, but you have used the products as instructed 
for 10 weeks and have seen no results. The purchase is non-refundable. How likely are you to continue 
using the weight loss products? 
o Extremely likely   
o Moderately likely   
o Slightly likely   
o Neither likely nor unlikely   
o Slightly unlikely   
o Moderately unlikely   





F. Imagine that you paid $20 two weeks ago for a ticket to attend a concert. You have really been looking 
forward to going to this concert. The day before the concert you find that you have lost the ticket. Later 
that day you meet someone who has a ticket which you could buy for $10. How likely are you to purchase 
another ticket? 
o Extremely likely   
o Moderately likely   
o Slightly likely   
o Neither likely nor unlikely   
o Slightly unlikely   
o Moderately unlikely   
o Extremely unlikely   
 
How many of the above questions did you answer correctly? 
o 1   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   




How confident are you that your previous answers are correct? 
o 1 - Not confident in your answers   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5 - Half confident in your answers   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   







3. Framing.  
This section has two near identical questions that are altered to assess the framing effect. In order to avoid 
recency, it is suggested to not have both questions near one another.  
a-1.  
In this brief survey we want to know what associations or thoughts come to mind when making consumer 
purchases. We will present you with pairs of possible associates. In each pair we want you to indicate by 
filling in one of the squares which item in the pair you are most apt to associate with a purchase of 75% 
99 
 
lean ground beef and the extent to which you associate the purchase with that item rather than the other 
item in the pair.  
 1  2  3  4  5   
Good-tasting o  o  o  o  o  Bad-tasting 
Greasy o  o  o  o  o  Greaseless 
High quality o  o  o  o  o  low quality 
fat o  o  o  o  o  lean 
 
a-2. 
In this brief survey we want to know what associations or thoughts come to mind when making consumer 
purchases. We will present you with pairs of possible associates. In each pair we want you to indicate by 
filling in one of the squares which item in the pair you are most apt to associate with a purchase of 25% 
fat ground beef and the extent to which you associate the purchase with that item rather than the other 
item in the pair.  
 1  2 3  4  5  
Good-tasting o  o  o  o  o  Bad-tasting 
Greasy o  o  o  o  o  Greaseless 
High quality o  o  o  o  o  low quality 





Please read the following infographic 
 
 
 After reading the infographic above, what is the likelihood you would use a condom during your next 
sexual encounter? ( please assume this as a hypothetical situation) 
o 1 - I have no intention of doing this   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   









Please read the following infographic 
 
 
After reading the infographic above, what is the likelihood you would use a condom during your next 
sexual encounter? ( please assume this as a hypothetical situation) 
o 1 - I have no intention of doing this    
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   








Imagine that you are approached by an individual to gamble. You are given $20.  You can either keep the 
$20 and NOT gamble or you can pay the $20 to take the gamble. 
 
If you gamble you have the chance to win $150.  The probability of losing  is 85%. 
 
Please rate on a scale of 1-10 on how likely you are to take the gamble.  (1 = would definitely not take the 
gamble, 10 = definitely would take the gamble). 
o 1 - would definitely not take the gamble   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   






Imagine that you are approached by an individual to gamble. You are given $20.  You can either keep the 
$20 and NOT gamble or you can pay the $20 to take the gamble. 
 
If you gamble you have the chance to win $150.  The probability of winning is 15%. 
 
Please rate on a scale of 1-10 on how likely you are to take the gamble.  (1 = would definitely not take the 




o 1 - would definitely not take the gamble 
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   





How confident are you that your above answers are correct? 
o 1 - Not confident at all   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5 - Half confident the answers are correct   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   







Probabilistic Numeracy Questions. 
Nine probabilistic numeracy questions from Ghazal (2014) were used to asses pre-post test measures of 
numeracy.  
1. People often roll dice when playing games.  Most dice have 6 sides and each side has a different 
number on it ranging from 1-6. If you rolled one of the dice, on average what is the probability that it 
would land on 5? 
o 1 time out of 6 rolls of the dice   
o 5 times out of 6 rolls of the dice   
o 1 time out of 2 rolls of the dice   
o 1 out of 5 rolls of the dice   
o 6 out of 1 roll of the dice   
 
2. Imagine that you are throwing 2 regular 6-sided dice up in the air.  If each side has a different number 
on it ranging from 1-6, on average what is the probability that both of them land on even numbers? 
o 1 out of  36 rolls of the dice   
o 3 out of 6 rolls of the dice   
o 1 out of 4 rolls of the dice   
o 2 out of 6 rolls of the dice   





3. Imagine that the probability of a child getting sunburned at the beach is 65% while the probability of an 
adult getting sunburned at the beach is 15%. If there were 300 people who spent a day at the beach, and 
60% of the people were children, how many people are likely to get a sunburn? 
o About 195   
o About 150   
o About 135   
o About 80   
o About 64   
 
4. Suppose you are taking an 8 question multiple choice test and each question has 4 options.  Imagine 
that you don’t know anything about the test and so you guess without reading the questions.  What’s the 
probability that you would get 100% correct on this test just by chance alone? 
o 1/4   
o 1/8   
o 1/4096   
o 1/16384   




5. Imagine that you are throwing 6 dice up in the air. What is the probability that all of them would land 
on even numbers? 
o 1/432   
o 3/216   
o 1/64   
o 3/6   
o 1/21   
 
6. Imagine you are drawing a picture, and are missing 2 spots you want to color. 
There are 7 colors to choose from. What’s the probability that both spots end up 
colored orange? 
o 1/49   
o 2/49   
o 1/7   
o 2/7   




7. Imagine you are throwing 8 dice up in the air. What’s the probability that half 
will land on an even number, while the other half land on 1? 
o 1/10368   
o 1/20736   
o 1/432   
o 1/1728   
o 1/6   
 
8. Phil is holding 4 cards in his hand: 8 of clubs, 5 of hearts, king of hearts, and 
ace of diamonds. If he places them on a table in random order, what is the 
probability that the first and last cards will both be hearts? 
o 1/2   
o 1/3   
o 1/4   
o 1/6   
o 1/8   
 
9. n is an integer chosen at random from the set {5, 7, 9, 11} 
p is chosen at random from the set {2, 6, 10, 14, 18} 
What is the probability that n + p = 23? 
o 0.1   
o 0.2  
o 0.25    
o 0.3   
o 0.4   
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Bias Blind Spot. 
The Bias Blind Spot is a measure of one’s general overplacement confidence of bias vulnerability. It is 
scored by asking for each question “To what extent do you believe that you are likely to commit the 
bias?”. Then score from not at all (1) to very often (7). Then a second question asking, “To what extent do 
you believe the average individual would commit the bias?”. Then score from not at all (1) to very often 
(7). A difference score is computed for each question by the following equation: “others score” – 
“yourself score” = Bias Blind Spot Score. Then for the Bias Blind Spot Score is aggregated and averaged 
for all questions. Previous studies (Ybarra, 2018) found that the original (Scopelliti et al., 2015) and new 
“Cognitive” items from Ybarra (2018) were correlated, but largely different. It is recommended to create 
an aggregate of all questions then score all questions from separate studies independently.   
 
1. Some people show a tendency to judge a harmful action as worse than an equally harmful 
inaction. For example, this tendency leads to thinking it is worse to falsely testify in court that 
someone is guilty, than not to testify that someone is innocent. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
2. Many psychological studies have found that people react differently to presented information 
depending on how it is “framed”.  For example, information framed positively will be interpreted 
differently compared to the same information framed negatively. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
3. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a tendency to do or believe a thing only 
because many other people believe or do that thing, to feel safer or to avoid conflict. (Scopelliti et 
al., 2015) 
 
4. Many psychological studies have shown that people react to counterevidence by strengthening 
their beliefs. For example, when exposed to negative evidence about their favorite political 
candidate, people tend to implicitly counterargue against that evidence, therefore strengthening 
their favorable feelings toward the candidate. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
5. Some people show a tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or 
time has been made. This tendency leads to thinking that it is better to invest further into an 
endeavor even if it is better to not.  For example, sitting through a movie after you realize it was 
awful halfway through. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
6. Some people show a tendency to choose probabilities that are larger ratios over probabilities that 
are equal or superior but are expressed with smaller ratios. For example, people would choose a 
drug that cures 10/100 patients over 1/10 patients, even though they cure equal amounts of 
individuals. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
7. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “disconfirmation” tendency in the way they 
evaluate research about potentially dangerous habits. That is, they are more critical and skeptical 
in evaluating evidence that an activity is dangerous when they engage in that activity than when 




8. Psychologists have identified an effect called “diffusion of responsibility,” where people tend not 
to help in an emergency when other people are present. This happens because as the number of 
bystanders increases, a bystander who sees other people standing around is less likely to interpret 
the incident as a problem, and also is less likely to feel individually responsible for taking action. 
(Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
9. Research has found that people will make irrational decisions to justify actions they have already 
taken. For example, when two people engage in a bidding war for an object, they can end up 
paying much more than the object is worth to justify the initial expenses associated with bidding. 
(Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
10. Extensive psychological research has shown that when presented with a new situation that people 
will compare the likelihood of the event to an event we think is similar.  For example, people 
think medical symptoms resemble their causes, for instance people mistakenly believe ulcers are 
caused by stress. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
11. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a tendency to make “overly dispositional 
inferences” in the way they view victims of assault crimes. That is, they are overly inclined to 
view the victim’s plight as one he or she brought on by carelessness, foolishness, misbehavior, or 
naivetë. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
12. Many psychological studies have found that people tend to weigh their judgments toward more 
recent information. That is, people may believe that an event is more likely to happen based on 
the amount of current news coverage rather than actual prevalence. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
13. Psychologists have claimed that people exhibit a “gambler’s fallacy” when an event happens 
more frequently than normal as it is falsely thought that there is a chance that it will happen less 
frequently in the future and vice-versa. For example, when you are playing a slot machine and 
losing, someone may believe that they are “due” for a win.  (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
14. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “halo” effect in the way they form 
impressions of attractive people. For instance, when it comes to assessing how nice, interesting, 
or able someone is, people tend to judge an attractive person more positively than he or she 
deserves. (Scopelliti et al., 2015) 
 
15. Extensive psychological research has shown that people possess an unconscious, automatic 
tendency to be less generous to people of a different race than to people of their race. This 
tendency has been shown to affect the behavior of everyone from doctors to taxi drivers. (Ybarra, 
2018) 
 
16. Psychologists have identified a tendency called the “ostrich effect,” an aversion to learning about 
potential losses. For example, people may try to avoid bad news by ignoring it. The name comes 





17. Psychologists have claimed that people believe that two events happening together is more 
probable than one event.  For example, people believe it is more probable that Katy Perry will 
release a hit single and win a Grammy than if Katy Perry will just release a hit song. (Ybarra, 
2018) 
 
18. Many psychological studies have found that people have the tendency to underestimate the 
impact or the strength of another person’s feelings. For example, people who have not been 
victims of discrimination do not really understand a victim’s social suffering and the emotional 
effects of discrimination. (Ybarra, 2018) 
 
19. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “self-interest” effect in the way they view 
political candidates. That is, people’s assessments of qualifications, and their judgments about the 
extent to which particular candidates would pursue policies good for the American people as a 
whole, are influenced by their feelings about whether the candidates’ policies would serve their 
own particular interests. (Ybarra, 2018) 
 
20. Psychological research has shown that people may display a “knew-it-all-along” effect after an 
event has occurred.  That is, people will see an outcome as predictable, despite there being little 
basis to predict it beforehand. (Ybarra, 2018) 
 
 
21. People often fail to notice the statistical likelihood that after an initial measurement of an extreme 
score, the following scores will move towards the average after additional measurements. For 
example, people tend to think that a rookie baseball player who breaks records in their first year 
will continue to excel, but the athlete’s performance the next year is likely to be average 
compared to other players. (Ybarra, 2018) 
 
22. Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “self-serving” tendency in the way they 
view their academic or job performance. That is, they tend to take credit for success but deny 
responsibility for failure. They see their successes as the result of personal qualities, like drive or 
ability, but their failures as the result of external factors, like unreasonable work requirements or 
inadequate instructions. (Ybarra, 2018) 
 
23. Psychologists have argued that gender biases lead people to associate men with technology and 
















Financial Literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2009). 
 
1. Basic Financial Literacy 
 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how 
much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? 
o More than $102   
o Exactly $102   
o Less than $102   
o Don't know   
o Refuse to respond   
 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the compound interest rate is 20% per year and you never 
withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have on this account in total?  
o More than $200   
o Exactly $200   
o Less than $200   
o Don't know   





Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2%  per year. 
After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? 
o More than today   
o Exactly the same amount as today    
o Less than today   
o Don't know   
o Refuse to respond   
 
Suppose that in the year 2020, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In 
2020, how much will you be able to buy with your income?  
o More than today   
o The same amount as today   
o Less than today   
o Don't know   
























2. Sophisticated Financial Literacy 
Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market? 
o The stock market helps to predict stock earnings   
o The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks    
o The stock market brings those who want to buy stock together with those who want to sell 
stock   
o None of the above    
o Don't know   
o Refuse to respond   
 
Which of the following statements is correct? 
o Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year    
o Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds   
o Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance    
o None of the above   
o Don't know   
o Refuse to respond    
 
If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices? 
o Rise   
o Fall    
o Stay the same    
o Don't know   




True or false? Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual  fund.  
o True   
o False    
o Don't know    
o Refuse to respond   
 
True or false? Stocks are normally riskier than bonds. 
o True   
o False    
o Don't know    
o Refuse to respond    
 
Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally gives the  highest 
return?  
o Savings accounts    
o Bonds   
o Stocks    
o Don't know    





Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time?  
o Savings accounts    
o Bonds   
o Stocks    
o Don't know   
o Refuse to respond    
 
When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of LOSING money: 
o Increase   
o Decrease    
o Stay the same    
o Don't know   



























A significant amount of attrition in participants returning for part 2 in a completed third 
condition led to removing the condition from statistical analyses. The third condition had 
individuals complete the risk tutor then two weeks later complete the post-test measures at home. 
This condition was removed as only 88 participants returned to complete part 2 compared to the 
other conditions where approximately 135 participants returned. Reasons for the attrition could 
not be identified; thus, the third condition was removed. Unfortunately, this removal of the 
participants led to unequal timing in some post-test measurements (e.g., graph literacy) between 
conditions. The control condition completed all post-test measures at home, while the risk 
literacy tutor condition completed the post-test measures immediately after completing the tutor 
in the laboratory. There were no other differences between conditions. Due to this, there is a 
chance that some between-group differences may be due to differences in testing location (in-lab 

















1. ANCOVA Graphs for Post-test Variable.  
Results indicated that there were no interactions of pre-test statistical numeracy with the condition.    
 
a. Graph Literacy 




















Correlations for all measures.  
 
 






The relationship between post-test graph literacy and overplacement. Further evidence of the relationship 


















2. Condition differences on visualizable decision making tasks.  
Regression analyses show trending improvements for ratio bias and sunk cost and significant 
improvements in framing effects for those when  
completed the risk tutor. Improvements in untrained, individual visualizable decision tasks can be seen 










3. Competing SEM Models  
The competing structural equation model shows how there is no relation between graph literacy and 
decision making confidence. Results lend evidence to the idea that the presented model in Figure 14 was 
selected. This model additionally showed poor fit : χ2 (3) = 32.35, CFI = .84, TLI = .52, RMSEA = 
.19 (0.13 – 0.25), SRMR = 0.07.  
 
4. Correlations for All Measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
16 17 
1. Condition (positive is risk tutor) 1.0                 
Pretest Measures   
2. Berlin Numeracy Test -S -.09 1.0                
3. Subjective Numeracy .00 .48** 1.0               
4. Graph Construction Knowledge -.06 .43** .17** 1.0              
 5. Subjective Graph Literacy 1 -.06 .24** .52** -.01 1.0             
Posttest Objective Measures    
6. Graph Literacy  .08 .51** .36** .33** .14** .1.0            
Visualizable Decision Tasks                   
           7.  Ratio Bias  .05 .40** .23** .25** .21** .29** 1.0 .          
            8. Sunk Cost .06 .06 -.05 .14** .04 .22** .23** .1.0          
            9. Framing .12* .21** .06 .18** .08 .36** .24** .10 1.0         
Financial Literacy                  
           10. Basic Financial Literacy  -.02 .49** .33** .23** .14* .43** .31** .07 .26** 1.0        
           11. Sophisticated Financial Literacy -.17** .23** .19** .18** .09 .18** .14** .04 .11 .44** 1.0       
Confidence Measures                  
          12. Subjective Graph Literacy 2 .01 .32** .48** .11 .59** .27** .22** .00 .17** .26** .20** 1.0      
          13. Ratio bias Overprecision -.10 -.18** -.05 --.13* -.04 -.09 n.a -.18 -.09 -.04 -.02 .01 1.0     
          14. Ratio Bias Overestimation -.09 -.19** -.01 -.18** .02 -.11 n.a -.18 -.09 -.11 -.02 .01 .86** 1.0    
          15. Sunk Cost Overprecision -.13* .12* .06* -.01 .12 .02 -.01 n.a. .07 .17** .14* .11 .29** .27** 1.0   
          16. Sunk Cost Overestimation -.06 .10 .12* -.03 .18** .01 .03 n.a .08 .20** .07 .22** .26** .35** .84** 1.0  
           17. Framing Overestimation -.19** -.07 .03 -.12 .05 -.27** -.12 -.11 n.a -.10 -.01 .01 .17** .20** .17** .20** 1.0 
Note: * = p < .05, * = p < .01; n.a. = measures were excluded as measures were used in the created measure (e.g., “ratio bias” was used to      





5. Factor Analysis of Graph Construction Knowledge Scale  
 
The 11 item graph knowledge scale was analyzed using a varimax rotated factor analysis. The 
full scale showed 59% variance explained over 5 components. After item reduction, a 5 item 
graph knowledge scale showed 51% variance explained over 2 components at a .39 Cronbach’s 
Alpha (Questions include: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10). The Graph Construction Knowledge scale needs 
refinement to be used for future endeavors if more domain specific graph knowledge (e.g., “pie 
graphs are most appropriate to communicate proportions”) is needed to be assessed or to be used 
as parallel forms to the Graph Literacy Scale.     
 
 
The figure above shows the finalized scree plots for the five item graph construction knowledge 





6. The hint mining process in conjunction with online tutors  
 
1. Hint Generation and Mining 
 
2. Hint Rating and Use
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Hints that certain 
individuals like 
most can be 
given other hints 
with similar tags
